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COMPULSORY POOLING IN NORTH DAKOTA:
SHOULD PRODUCTION INCOME AND EXPENSES BE
DIVIDED FROM DATE OF POOLING,
SPACING, OR "FIRST RUNS?"
OWEN L. ANDERSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Whether compulsory pooling orders may be retroactive and to
what point in time they are retroactive are recurring issues among
North Dakota oil and gas attorneys.1 There are a number of
possible answers to these issues. One possibility is that compulsory
pooling orders are not retroactive at all. In that situation
production would be allocated among pooled interests from the
date of the pooling order. If, however, compulsory pooling orders
are retroactive, then production could be allocated among the
*Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law; Special Counsel to the
North Dakota Industrial Commission and to the Attorney General of North Dakota. The author
acknowledges the assistance of Joanne Liebmann, third year law student, University of North
Dakota School of Law, for her assistance in writing, editing, and footnoting this article and also
acknowledges the assistance of Kathie Anderson in editing this article.
1. The North Dakota Industrial Commission is the state's oil and gas conservation authority.
N.D. CENT. CODE 5 38-08-04 (Supp. 1981). The Industrial Commission inserts the following
standard paragraph in "temporary" spacing orders (spacing orders issued shortly after a "wildcat"
discovery is made which are effective for approximately 18 months, N.D. ADMIN. CODE S 43-02-03-
18(3) (1981)): "That for purposes of division of production to owners of interests in spacing units
established by this order, and proven productive prior to the date hereof, this order shall be
retroactive to the date of first production." Telephone conversation with F. E. Wilborn, Deputy
Chief Enforcement Officer, North Dakota Industrial Commission, Oil and Gas Division (Feb. 9,
1982). Similar language is placed in compulsory pooling orders at the request of the applicant. Id.
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interest owners from the date a compulsory pooling order is applied
for, from the date a spacing order is issued or applied for, or from
the date of "first runs" (first production).
2
The issues of retroactive pooling orders can arise in two basic
fact situations. The first basic fact situation follows: Assume A and
B each own a one-half undivided interest in Blackacre, a 160 acre
tract of land in western North Dakota. Assume A has executed an
oil and gas lease to X, and B has executed an oil and gas lease to Y.
Y has drilled and completed a producing "wildcat well ' 3 on
Blackacre in which X has refused to participate. Subsequently, the
North Dakota Industrial Commission dockets a spacing hearing,
and later it issues a "well spacing order" setting "well spacing
units" for the field at 160 acres, with Blackacre comprising one
well spacing unit. 4 Subsequent to the spacing order, Y applies for a
compulsory pooling order, requesting that the Industrial
Commission pool the interests of A, B, X, and Y in Blackacre.
5
The second basic fact situation is identical except that A and B
own divided interests in Blackacre. Assume A owns the north half of
Blackacre, a 160 acre tract, and B owns the south half of Blackacre.
Assume A has leased to X and B has leased to Y. Y has drilled and
completed a producing wildcat well on Blackacre, and X has
refused to participate in the venture. Subsequently, the Industrial
Commission dockets a spacing hearing, and later it issues a well
spacing order setting well spacing units for the field at 160 acres,
with Blackacre comprising one well spacing unit. Y applies for a
compulsory pooling order, requesting that the Commission
determine the interests of A, B, X, and Y.
Other factors can change the two basic fact situations. Instead
2. Other dates are also possible, such as the date of the pooling or spacing hearing.
3. A wildcat well is defined as "ain exploratory well being drilled in unproven territory, that is,
in a horizon from which there is no production in the general area. Since the meaning is vague, it
should be observed that some wells are more wildcat than others." H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS,
MANUAL OF OIL & GAS TERMS 834 (5th ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as OIL & GAS TERMS].
4. Well spacing is defined as "[tihe regulation of the number and location of wells over an oil or
gas reservoir, as a conservation measure.... Well spacing is normally accomplished by order of the
regulatory conservation commission." Id. at 829. The North Dakota Industrial Commission is
authorized to regulate well spacing in North Dakota. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 38-08-04(2) (C), -07
(Supp. 1981).
5. Compulsory pooling is defined as follows:
Itihe bringing together, as required by law or a valid order or regulation, of separately
owned (or separate interests in) small tracts sufficient for the granting of a well permit
under applicable spacing rules .... Pooling is important in preventing the drilling of
unnecessary and uneconomic wells, which will result in physical and economic waste.
OIL & GAS TERMS, supra note 3, at 125.
Compulsory pooling orders are also issued after a well has been drilled for the purpose of
bringing together all tracts in a well spacing unit so that production and costs can be allocated among
all interest owners in the unit. 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS OIL & GAS LAW § 905.1, at 14 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as WILLIAMS & MEYERS]. The North Dakota Industrial Commission is authorized
to issue compulsory pooling orders. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-08 (1980).
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of a wildcat well drilled, completed, and producing before the
establishment of well spacing units, the well may be a development
well drilled after the establishment of well spacing units. The
nonparticipating lessee (X) may be the applicant for the
compulsory pooling order. B may not have leased to anyone. The
interest owners may have refused to voluntarily pool because of a
dispute over the sharing of production, the sharing of costs, the
calculation of costs, or a combination thereof. The compulsory
pooling order may be requested prior to drilling, prior to the
establishment of well spacing units, or after the establishment of
well spacing units.
This Article will summarize and briefly discuss the rule on the
division of well production and expenses under the first basic fact
situation dealing with undivided interests. The matter is well
settled in North Dakota and many jurisdictions; the decisions are
based on long standing principles of cotenancy law.
The principle issue of this Article is whether, and to what point
in time, compulsory pooling orders may be retroactive where
divided interests are concerned, the second basic fact situation. The
North Dakota Supreme Court has not ruled on this matter. Those
few jurisdictions that have ruled on the issue are not in full accord.
This Article will summarize and analyze existing case law and
suggest what the North Dakota rule should be based on the
pertinent provisions of North Dakota's oil and gas conservation act
and rules.
II. ALLOCATION OF PRODUCTION AMONG
UNDIVIDED INTERESTS
When there are undivided interests in a well spacing unit,
allocation of production and costs is retroactive to the date of first
runs (first production). The parties are cotenants and are
accountable to each other at the inception of any oil and gas
production on Blackacre. Each cotenant has a present vested
interest in the property and is entitled to share in any profits
resulting from oil and gas development. 6
Development by one cotenant does not constitute waste to
other cotenants in most oil producing jurisdictions. 7 In these
6. See generally Note, Rights of Nonleasing Fractional Mineral Interest Owners, 58 N.D.L. REv. 647
(1982).
7. See 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 5, § 502. The justification for this rule has been that "if
a substantial portion of the economic value of land is represented by the minerals [underlying the
leasehold] . • . denial of the right of a concurrent owner to remove minerals represents the denial to
him of the beneficial enjoyment of his interest in the land." Id. § 502, at 562. Additionally, it has
been noted that "[ilfa cotenant owning a small interest in the land had to give his consent before the
539
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jurisdictions, pooling of the undivided interests in a well spacing
unit is not usually necessary as a matter of law. But, when there is a
dispute over accounting requirements, such as allocation of
production or production costs, compulsory pooling procedures
may provide an avenue to address such problems. This is clearly
contemplated under the North Dakota compulsory pooling
statute, 8 even though there appears to be a contrary interpretation
by the North Dakota Supreme Court.9
others could move towards securing the oil, he could arbitrarily destroy the valuable quality of the
land." Id. § 502, at 562-63 (citing Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 147 S.W. 330, 335 (Tex. Civ. App.
1912), aff'd, 108 Tex. 555, 195 S.W. 1139(1917)).
North Dakota appears to follow the rule that development by one cotenant does not constitute
waste to other cotenants. In Schank v. North Am. Royalties, Inc., 201 N.W.2d 419 (N.D. 1972), the
North Dakota Supreme Court, in reviewing the law ofcotenancy, stated the following:
It is a well-established general rule in most jurisdictions that the owners of undivided
portions of gas and oil rights in and under the same land are tenants in common and
each cotenant may enter upon the premises for the purpose of exploring for oil and gas
and may drill and develop such premises. Each cotenant may exercise the same right
and privilege with reference to the common property. Each owner in a cotenancy acts
for himself, and no one is the agent for the other nor has any authority to bind the
other merely because of the relationship, unless authorized to do so. Upon discovery of
oil and gas upon the premises, the producing cotenant must account to the
nonconsenting or nonproducing cotenant for his pro rata share of the net profits
apportioned according to the fractional interest of said cotenant. Each cotenant may
lease his undivided interest in the common property without the consent of the other
cotenants and such lease is effective as to his interest in the property but ineffective as
to the interest belonging to his cotenant.
Id. at 429 (citations omitted). Cf North Am. Coal Corp. v. Huber, 268 N.W.2d 593 (N.D. 1978), In
Huber the plaintiff coal mine operator sought a permit to surface mine coal when a cotenant surface
owner had refused to consent to the surface mining operations. Id. at 595. The North Dakota
Supreme Court refused to grant permission to mine based on a provision of the state Surface Owner
Protection Act, N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 38-18 (1972 & Supp. 1981), governing coal surface mining
that provided that a mineral developer had to own or have all coal underlying a given tract under
lease. 268 N.W.2d at 597-98. In other words, if any portion of the coal is not leased or owned, an
action to permit mining under the act cannot be brought.
Huber is not a repudiation of the general view expressed in Schank, but merely interprets the
statutory provision governing coal surface mining. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 38-18-05(3) (1980); 1975
N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 321, § 5. Section 38-18-05(3) of the North Dakota Century Code has been
amended to provide that the mineral developer must own 75% of the coal or have 75% of the coal
under lease before surface mining operations may be conducted. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18-05(3)
(Supp. 1981): 1981 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 375, § 1.
8. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-08(1) (1980). Section 38-08-08(1) provides in part the following:
When two or more separately owned tracts are embraced within a spacing unit, or when
there are separately owned interests in all or part of a spacing unit, then the owners and royalty
owners thereof may pool their interests for the development and operation of the
spacing unit. In the absence of voluntary pooling, the commission upon the
application of any interested person shall enter an order pooling all interests in the spacing
unit for the development and operation thereof.
Id. (emphasis added).
9. See Schank v. North Am. Royalties, Inc.. 201 N.W.2d at 432. In Schank the North Dakota
Supreme Court implied that the pooling statute only authorized the compulsory pooling of separately
owned tracts and that separately owned interests could only be voluntarily pooled. Id. This
misinterpretation resulted from reading the following sentence of section 38-08-08(1) of the North
Dakota Century Code out of context: "Operations incident to the drilling ofa well upon any portion
of a spacing unit covered by a pooling order shall be deemed, for all purposes, the conduct of such
operations upon each separately owned tract in the drilling unit by the several owners thereof."
N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-08(1) (1980). Subsection 1, however, refers to the "voluntary" pooling of
both "separately owned tracts" and "separately owned interests" and provides that "[iln the absence
of voluntary pooling, the commission . ..shall enter an order pooling all interests in the spacing
unit.'" Id. (emphasis added). See also Discussion Notes, 43 OiL & GAS REP. (MB) 240, 241 (1973).
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In a minority of jurisdictions, development of minerals by one
cotenant constitutes waste to another cotenant.' 0 In other words,
mineral development cannot occur unless all cotenants consent. In
these jurisdictions a compulsory pooling statute providing for the
pooling of undivided interests can be a fast administrative method
to determine the parties' respective rights so that oil and gas
development may proceed. Even under the minority view, any
production should be allocated among all cotenants from the date
of first production. If, however, oil and gas development occurs
without the consent of all cotenants, the nonconsenting cotenant
may be able to exact a penalty for waste from the developing
cotenant. I I
Thus, under either the majority or the minority view,
allocation among all cotenants should occur from the date of first
production. This matter was addressed as an afterthought in Schank
v. North American Royalties, Inc.12 In Schank the North Dakota
Supreme Court ruled that two oil and gas leases held by North
American Royalties, Inc., a nondeveloping cotenant, terminated
for nonpayment of delay rentals even though another cotenant
lessee, Cardinal Petroleum Company, had commenced and
completed a producing well on the leased premises before the
expiration of the first year of the primary term of the two North
American leases.' 3 The decision in the Schank case turned on lease
language in the habendum, granting, well completion, and pooling
clauses in the two North American leases. The leases referred to the
authority and obligations of the "lessee," the lessee being the
specific lessee under the two leases (North American) rather than
the cotenant lessee (Cardinal) of another cotenant lessor.14 The
delay rental clause provided that "[i]f no well be commenced on said
land on or before [the lease anniversary date] . . . this lease shall
terminate as to both parties, unless the lessee on or before that date
[shall pay a delay rental] .... "1,5 Notwithstanding this provision of
the delay rental clause, the North Dakota Supreme Court ruled
that the two North American leases had terminated. 16 Although
10. See, e. g., Gulf Refining Co. v. Carroll, 145 La. 299, 82 So. 277 (1919); Hall v. Vernon, 47
W. Va. 295, 34 S.E. 764 (1899). The basis for this rule is the Statute of Westminister 11, ch. 22
(1285). 2 WiLlSAsNs & MEYERS, supra note 5, S 502.
11. Generally, in those jurisdictions that view development by one cotenant without the consent
of another cotenant as waste, the measure of damages for a nonconsenting cotenant is the value of the
oil and gas "at the well." This means that the developing cotenant must account to the
noneonsenting cotenant for a proportionate share of the oil and gas produced without a deduction of
drilling and lifting costs. 2 Wt.LIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 5, S 504.2.
12. 201 N.W.2d 419 (N.D. 1972).
13. Schank v. North Am. Royalties, Inc., 201 N.W.2d 419, 433 (N.D. 1972).
14. Id. at 426.
15. Id. at 424 (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 433. The North Dakota Supreme Court cited Earp v. Mid-Continent Petroleum
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North American's leases had terminated, the court ruled that
North American, as a cotenant owner of an undivided interest, was
entitled to a share of the production prior to the termination of the
leases. I 7
III. ALLOCATION OF PRODUCTION AMONG DIVIDED
INTERESTS
The remainder of this Article deals with the allocation of
production and costs among divided interests in a spacing unit, the
second basic fact situation described above. Controversies may
develop over whether and to what point in time the allocation of
production and costs among divided interests in a spacing unit
pursuant to a compulsory pooling order can be retroactive.
Jurisdictions that have addressed these issues have reached various
conclusions. The well spacing and compulsory pooling laws, rules,
and policies of these jurisdictions, though similar, are not identical.
Moreover, none of the spacing and pooling laws, rules, and policies
of these jurisdictions are identical with those of North Dakota. The
supreme courts of Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Nebraska, and a
federal district court in Colorado have addressed these issues. Their
conclusions will be examined in the remainder of this section.
A. OKLAHOMA
The Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed the retroactivity of
compulsory pooling orders on three occasions between 1950 and
1977. 18 The line of cases begins with the confusing opinion of Wood
Corp., 167 Okla. 86, 27 P.2d 855 (1933), as a case consistent with the ruling in Schank. 201 N.W.2d
at 433.
17. 201 N.W.2d at 433-44. The court stated the following:
For the reasons set forth herein we hold that the Schank lease and the Rakowski
lease terminated by nonpayment of delay rentals on July 1 and 2, 1970, respectively,
according to the terms of their leases. Because there was production prior to the
termination dates of these leases, we also hold that the lessees are entitled to their
proportionate shares of the royalties from the oil produced prior toJuly 1, 1970, from
the Schank fractional interest and from that produced prior toJuly 2, 1970, from the
Rakowski fractional interest, less their proportionate obligations for the necessary and
reasonable expenses incurred in the producing and marketing accumulated prior to
the termination of the respective leases.
Id.
18. Ward v. Corporation Comm'n, 501 P.2d 503 (Okla. 1972); Wood Oil Co. v. Corporation
Comm'n, 268 P.2d 878 (Okla. 1953) [hereinafter referred to as Wood Oil III]; Wood Oil Co. v.
Corporation Comm'n, 205 Okla. 537, 239 P.2d 1023 (1950) [hereinafter referred to as Wood Oil il.
The retroactivity of compulsory pooling orders was also considered by the Oklahoma Court of
Appeals in Barton v. Cleary Petroleum Corp., 566 P.2d 462 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977). Additionally,
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Oil Co. v. Corporation Commission (Wood Oil II). 19 Wood Oil
Company (Wood) drilled and completed a producing well on its
leased acreage on December 21, 1946. On April 1, 1947, the
Oklahoma Corporation Commission issued a spacing order that
extended the boundaries of an existing oil field to encompass the
land surrounding the Wood well. The spacing unit included leased
acreage belonging to Wood and a separate tract partially owned by
Toklan Production Company and J. G. Catlett, Inc. (Toklan).
20
Toklan applied to the Corporation Commission for a compulsory
pooling order pooling all interests in the spacing unit. The
compulsory pooling order was issued July 1, 1947, but the order
provided that production should be allocated from the date of first
production of the Wood well. 2 1 On appeal Wood contested the
retroactivity of the compulsory pooling order to the date of first
production. 22
A careful reading of the opinion and of more recent opinions
discussing Wood Oil II indicates that the court held that allocation of
production was to be retroactive only to the date of the spacing
order rather than to the date of first production. A careful reading
is necessary because throughout much of the opinion the court used
the terms "spacing," "pooling," and "unitization" inter-
changeably. For example, the court said:
We think it follows from this statement of the law
that Wood Oil had title absolute to the oil by it produced
prior to the pooling. We find nothing in the conservation
law that purports to disturb the title of the producer
thereto. The effect of the order of the Commission is to
treat the unitization effective as of the time of the drilling of
the well and the interest of Toklan in the production
coincident with that of Wood Oil. To the extent the order
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals construed Oklahoma law on the matter in Whitaker v.
Texaco, Inc., 283 F.2d 169 (10th Cir. 1960). The issue of retroactivity of a well spacing order was
mentioned but not addressed in Brooks Hall Corp. v. Seahy, 571 P.2d 462 (Okla. 1977), and
Kuykendall v. Corporation Comm'n, 597 P.2d 1221 (Okla. Ct. App. 1979). Retroactivity of well
allowable orders was considered in Dodds v. Ward, 418 P.2d 629 (Okla. 1966), and Corporation
Comm'n v. Petroleum Co., 536 P.2d 1284 (Okla. 1975).
19. 205 Okla. 537, 239 P.2d 1023 (1950).
20. Wood Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 205 Okla. 537, __ , 239 P.2d 1023, 1025
(1950).
21. Id. at __ , 239 P. 2d at 1025-26. Because this action involved a dispute between working
interest owners, the compulsory pooling order determined the cost of the well to Wood and provided
for the allocation of drilling and production expenses. Toklan was to pay its full share of such
expenses, subject to a credit in the amount of Toklan's share of production from the date of first
production. Id. at __ , 239 P.2d at 1026.
22. Id. In the companion case of Wood Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 205 Okla. 534, 239
P.2d 1021 (1950), Wood appealed an order denying its application to alter the well spacing unit to
eliminate the lands ofToklan and Catlett. Id. at ____, 239 P.2d at 1022. Wood lost this appeal. Id.
at ____, 239 P.2d at 1023. This case is commonly referred to as Wood Oil I.
543
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holds Wood Oil accountable to Toklan directly or
indirectly for a share in the production before the spacing
unit was created same is not authorized by law and it was
error so to hold.
That the Commission was clothed with power to
apportion the production had after pooling where




The Wood Oil II court used three grounds to justify its holding
that the allocation of production was retroactive only to the date of
the spacing order. 24 First, under the nonownership theory, 25 a
mineral owner or lessee does not own the oil and gas in place but
only has the right to reduce the oil and gas to possession. 26 Second,
under the rule of capture a mineral owner may drain oil and gas
from the land of others without liability. 27 Third, this right to drain
and capture is unlimited, subject to the power of the state to
prevent waste.
2 8
The court reasoned that the power of the state to prevent waste
was exercised when the Corporation Commission issued a well
spacing order providing that only one well could be drilled in each
spacing unit. 29 Prior to that time, however, in accordance with the
rule of capture, Wood had absolute title to all of the oil and gas
produced.3 0 The court stated that the following paragraph from the
spacing order 31 declared that Toklan's right to share in the
23. 205 Okla. at __ , 239 P.2d at 1026 (emphasis added).
24. Id. The court reasoned that:
Landowners do not have absolute title to the gas and oil that may permeate below
the surface .... Every person has the right to drill wells on his own land and take from
the pools below all the gas and oil that he may be able to reduce to possession including
that coming from land belonging to others, . . . subject to the reasonable exertion of
the power of the state to prevent unnecessary loss, destruction, or waste.
205 Okla. at __ , 239 P.2d at 1026 (quoting Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n,
286 U.S. 210, 223 (1931)).
25. The nonownership theory is:
The theory that no person owns oil and gas until it is produced, but that the right
to produce is limited to those persons who own land upon which a well may be drilled
... A jurisdiction adopting this theory must necessarily hold . . . that any interest in
the minerals created by a land owner is necessarily nonpossessory or incorporeal in
character ....
OIL & GAS TERMS, supra note 3, at 472.
26. 205 Okla. at __ , 239 P.2d at 1026.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at __ , 239 P.2d at 1026-27.
30. Id. at __ , 239 P.2d at 1026.
31. The court referred to the spacing order as a pooling order in some parts of the opinion. E.g.,
idat __ , 239 P.2d at 1027.
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production was vested as of the date of the spacing order: "That in
the event there are divided or undivided interests within any unit
and the parties are unable to agree on a plan for the development
for the unit, then the rights and equities shall be adjusted as
provided for by [the compulsory pooling statute32 ]. "3 The court
reasoned that because the compulsory pooling order was issued
later, pursuant to the above paragraph, the pooling order could be
retroactive only to the date of the spacing order. 34  The court
refused to accept Wood's estoppel argument that Toklan had
unreasonably delayed in asserting its right to share in the
production .5
The Oklahoma court noted that working interest owners are
proportionately liable for the "cost of development and equipping a
well ' 36  and then concluded that Toklan was liable for a
proportionate share of the "cost of completing and equipping the
well. ' 31 Presumably, such costs could include the costs of well
drilling, well completion, and well maintenance. These costs were
to be allocated on an acreage basis "without deduction for any
production prior to the date of the pooling [spacing]. "38 The
meaning of this phrase is uncertain. It appears that a straight
acreage allocation of costs should be made, although under the
court's holding Wood received all the production from the well for
32. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87(d) (Supp. 1945) (repealed, 1947 Okla. Sess. Laws 331, 5 2)
(currently codified at OK.LA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 87.1 (West Supp. 1981-1982)).
33. 205 Okla. at __ , 239 P.2d at 1027.
34. Id. In holding that the compulsory pooling order could only be retroactive to the date of the
spacing order, the court concluded that "[tihe language contemplates a further hearing if need be to
determine the question of the respective rights with reference to the costs, etc., and, in contemplation
of law, the determination at such hearing is a part of the order and effective as of the date of the
order." Id.
35. Id. In denying estoppel, the court reasoned as follows:
There exists no ground of estoppel. In the first place the Wood Oil suffered no
prejudice by Toklan's delay in asserting its right. In the second place with the entry of
the order ofApril 1, 1947, the right of Toklan to participate in the production arose as
a matter of law and Wood Oil, being equally interested in the terms upon which the
right should be enjoyed and at liberty to invoke a determination thereof, cannot
properly ask to profit by the laxity of another which, at the worst, is but comparable to
its own.
Id.
36. Id. (emphasis added).
37. Id. (emphasis added). The precise meanings of the words "development and equipping,"
"completing and equipping," or similar phrases such as "drilling and completing" are uncertain
when used by courts in this context. Technically, the word drilling would mean the operations of the
rig in penetrating the surface and the actual drilling of the well to its total depth. Drilling is also
commonly used to describe any well-site preparations; however, the term would not normally be
used to include exploration. In the oil and gas industry the phrase "completing and equipping"
means operations to obtain production following the actual drilling of the well. It would include
perforating the reservoir, running production tubing, and installing a "Christmas tree" (pump).
The term development could be broad enough to include the costs of lease acquisition, exploration,
drilling, completing, producing, and marketing. This author has presumed that the Wood Oil Hcourt
meant the costs of drilling and the costs of completing and equipping in the context of the case.
38. Id. at _-., 239 P.2d at 1027-28.
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over four months.
39
Dictum in a supplementary case, Wood Oil Co. v. Corporation
Commission (Wood Oil 111)40 somewhat clarified the holding in Wood
Oil II. Wood Oil III dealt with whether Wood could recover interest
from Toklan on the money it spent in drilling and completing the
well. 41 The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that interest could not
be recovered absent a showing that Wood itself paid interest on the
funds expended to obtain production. 42 In reviewing Wood Oil II,
however, the court stated:
[T]his Court in [ Wood Oil II] reversed the Commission's
[compulsory pooling order] in so far as it gave Toklan any
share in the Wood Oil's well's production before the
creation &I the spacing unit, but upheld said order as to the
above described interest it gave Toklan in the well's
production subsequent to the creation of said unit.
43
In our opinion in Wood Oil (11], we held the
Commission's order invalid as to that portion of the oil
produced by the well prior to the time that body had
exercised its jurisdiction over the matter by creating the
spacing unit, but, as herein indicated, we still cannot agree
with Wood Oil's contention as to that portion produced
after said order was made and became effective.
4
Here the court consistently refers to the date the "spacing units"
were created as the starting date for allocating production to
Toklan.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court further clarified this issue in
Ward v. Corporation Commission45 wherein the court again faced the
issue of "whether non-drilling oil and gas lessees and owners within
the [spacing] unit share in the [spacing] unit production as of the
date the Commission order established the spacing (drilling)
unit. '' 6 Ward and others owned certain tracts that comprised
forty-five percent of a section of land. Tenneco owned the
remaining tracts in the section. Ward completed a well in the
39. The fairness of this cost allocation is discussed infra notes 142-61 and accompanying text.
40. 268 P.2d 878 (Okla. 1953). The court called this case a "sequel" to Wood Oil I. Wood Oil
Co. v. Corporation Comm'n. 268 P.2d 878. 879 (Okla. 1953).
41. Id. at 885.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 880 (emphasis in original and emphasis added).
44. Id. at 884 (emphasis added).
45. 501 P.2d 503 (Okla. 1972).
46. Ward v. Corporation Comm'n, 501 P.2d 503. 503 (Okla. 1972).
546
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northeast quarter of the section on January 7, 1969.47 On February
4, 1969, Tenneco applied for 640 acre spacing, and on March 11,
1969, Ward applied for 160 acre spacing.4 8 On June 26, 1969, the
Corporation Commission issued an order establishing 640 acre
spacing units. 49 Ward appealed this decision, but lost.5 0 On
February 17, 1971, the Corporation Commission issued a
compulsory pooling order, pooling all interests in the section.
51
This order was later modified, at Tenneco's request, to provide
specifically for retroactive allocation of production to the date of the
well spacing order. 52 Ward appealed, asserting that Tenneco's
right to participate in production was effective only from the date of
the compulsory pooling order.
5 3
In line with its previous decisions in Wood Oil H and Wood Oil
III, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that Tenneco's right to
participate was retroactive to the date of the spacing order.
54
Tenneco apparently did not argue that production should be
allocated from the date of "first runs" or from the date of the
application for spacing. In fact, in its argument Ward noted:
Although Ward had completed the well in January of
1969, the well did not go on stream for a considerable
period of time awaiting a favorable market. Ward could
have produced the well upon completion, on or about
January 7, 1969, until June 26, 1969, the date of the
spacing order, and owned all production without question.1
5
In rejecting Ward's argument, the court said that its holding in the
Wood cases was a necessary construction ef the Conservation Act
to meet the requirements of the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution. 56 The court also further clarified its
47. Id. at 504.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. The Commission order was affirmed in Ward v. Corporation Comm'n, 470 P.2d 993
(Okla. 1970).
51. 501 P.2d at 504.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 505. Ward is distinguishable from the Wood Oil cases. Unlike the Wood Oil cases, which
dealt with the extension ofexisting field boundaries, Warddealt with the establishment of a new field.
54. Id. at 507.
55. Id. at 505 (quoting from Ward's brief) (emphasis added). In the Wood Oil cases, no similar
argument concerning marketing was made.
56. Id. at 507. The court stated the following:
[To give [the Conservation Act] a construction that meets the constitutional
requirements of due process, this section [of the Act[ must mean ... that the oil and
gas lessees and others who own interests in the spacing (drilling) unit, share in the
production of the unit well (whether drilled before or after the spacing (drilling) unit is
established) as of the time the unit is established. At the time the unit is established a
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holdings in Wood Oil H and Wood Oil III.51
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals, in Barton v. Cleary Petroleum
Corp., 58 followed the Ward and the Wood decisions. In Barton the
dispute arose between a lessee-developer and the mineral owners of
an unleased tract within a spacing unit. In accordance with a
provision of the Conservation Act, 59 the court held that the
unleased mineral owners were entitled to a one-eighth royalty on
the production attributable to their tract from the date of the
spacing order.60 Because the pooling order was retroactive only to
the date of spacing, the unleased mineral owners were given a
royalty for nine months,6 1 even though the well apparently had
produced for over two years.
62
In summary, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has ruled that
compulsory pooling orders are retroactive to the date of spacing for
the purpose of dividing production. The Oklahoma decisions do
provide, however, that working interest owners in the spacing unit
may be charged with a share of the drilling costs although the
drilling party recieved all of the production prior to the date of
unit well is or probably soon will be producing oil or gas. At the moment production
commences, resulting pressure differentials in the common source of supply portend,
in greater or less degree, drainage from all parts of the unit toward the producing unit
well. This drainage is occurring from areas where oil and gas lessees are prohibited
from doing anything to protect their leased premises from drainage. With the purpose
of Jthe Conservation Act] to prevent the drilling of unnecessary wells beli~rc it, the
Commission will not, except in extreme cases, make an exception to the rule that
permits one producing well only on each spacing (drilling) unit, To impose this denial
without granting the right to participate in production of the unit well, as of the time
the non-drilling owners were prohibited from drilling, is the taking by the State of
their property without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.
Id. (citing Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 57 (1936)).
57. 501 P.2d at 505-06. The court stated that in Wood Oil II it had held that "the non-drilling
owners of a divided interest . . . in a spacing unit larel entitled to share in the production from the
unit well commencing on the date the Commission established the unit." Id. at 505. In Wood Oil III
the court explained its holding in Wood Oil H by saying that "iln . . . Wood Oil 1I11, we held the
Commission's order invalid as to that portion of the oil produced by the well prior to the titte that
body had exercised its jurisdiction over the matter by creating the spacing unit...." Id. at 506
(citing Wood Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 268 P.2d 878, 884 (Okla. 1954)). In WoodOiIII the
court declined to hold the Commission's order invalid with regard to (he portion of oil and gas
produced after the order was made and became effective. 268 P.2d at 884.
58. 566 P.2d 462 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977).
59. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87. l(d) (Supp. 1981-1982). Section 87. l(d) provides as follows:
For the purpose of this section the owner, or owners, of oil and gas rights in and
under an unleased tract of land shall be regarded as a lessee to the extent of a seven-
eighths (7/8) interest in and to said rights and a lessor to the extent of the remaining
one-eighth (1/8) interest therein.
Id.
60. Barton v. Cleary Petroleum Corp., 566 P.2d 462, 464 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977).
61. Id. The well was drilled in January 1972 and the gas was marketed in August of that year.
Id. at 463. The 640 acre well spacing unit was not established until March 7, 1974. Id. In November
1974 the well was plugged and abandoned. Id.
62. Id. The fairness of this is discussed infra notes 142-61 and accompanying text.
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spacing. 63 Of course, in the case of development wells drilled in a
field where the spacing has already been determined by an order of
the Corporation Commission, the allocation of production would
occur as of the date of first production.
B. LOUISIANA
In Desormeaux v. Inexco Oil Co. 64 the Louisiana Court of Appeals
adopted a view in accordance with the Oklahoma view. In
Desormeaux Inexco brought in a producing well on September 20,
1970, on land leased from the plaintiff. A conservation order
establishing a spacing unit became effective on June 30, 1971.65
The plaintiff owned all the property within the unit and leased part
of the property to Inexco. The plaintiff did not lease the remainder
of the property.
66
Prior to the effective date of the spacing unit order, plaintiff
was paid only a royalty as reserved in the lease. 67 Plaintiff,
however, demanded payment for the proportionate share of the net
production attributable to his unleased land within the unit from
the date of first runs. In the alternative, plaintiff demanded
payment for the proportionate share of production attributable to
his unleased land within the unit as of the date the spacing unit
became effective, without any deduction for the cost of drilling or
completing the well. 68 The trial court adopted the plaintiff's second
argument. On appeal the defendant-lessee asserted that the
plaintiff should pay a proportionate share of the drilling and
completion costs.
69
The appellate court applied the rule of capture, as the
Oklahoma court did in the Wood Oil cases, and affirmed the trial
court's ruling. The court stated that in Louisiana a mineral owner
does not own the minerals in place, but only has a right to explore
for minerals and reduce them to possession. In disputes between
adjacent holders of that right the rule of capture governs, unless
the Conservation Act has modified the rule. 70 The court also stated
that when well spacing units are created the rule of capture is
63. See, e.g., Wood Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 205 Okla. 537, -, 239 P.2d 1023,
1027-28 (1950).
64. 298 So. 2d 897 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 302 So. 2d 37 (La. 1974).
65. Desormeaux v. Inexco Oil Co., 298 So. 2d 897, 898 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 302 So. 2d
37 (La. 1974). Throughout the Desonneaux opinion, spacing is called "unitization" by the court.
66. 298 So. 2d at 898-99.
67. Id. at 899.
68. Id. at 898.
69. Id. at 898-99. The facts indicated that the well "paid-out" prior to the date of spacing, Id. at
901.
70. Id. at 899.
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modified, and owners of all tracts within a well spacing unit are
insured ajust and equitable share of production.71
Because the well in the Desormeaux case "paid-out" prior to the
effective date of spacing, the court ruled that the costs of drilling
and completing the well could not be charged against the plaintiff's
share of production. The court said that to do so would allow tfe
defendant double recovery, once from production prior to the date
of spacing and once thereafter. 72
Like the Oklahoma courts, the Louisiana Court of Appeals
held that compulsory pooling orders are retroactive to the date of
spacing for the purpose of allocating production. However, the
court of appeals did not assess drilling costs against the nondrilling
parties because the well had already "paid-out" prior to spacing.
The Oklahoma cases did not address payout, but Wood Oil II did
assess drilling costs against the nondrilling working interest owners
although the driller received all the production prior to spacing. 13
C. NEBRASKA
The Nebraska Supreme Court addressed the issue of
retroactivity of a compulsory pooling order in Farmers Irrigation
District v. Schumacher.7 4 White Feather Petroleum Company (White
Feather) completed a producing well on a 43.92 acre tract on
October 15, 1964. Farmers Irrigation District and its lessee, Sun
Oil Company (referred to collectively as Farmers), owned a small
4.19 acre tract. These two tracts comprised a governmental lot or
legal subdivision.7 5 Farmers applied for an order from the
Nebraska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission pooling all
interests in the governmental lot. The application was filed on
January 16, 1967,76 although Farmers had notified White Feather
that it claimed an interest in the well on December 22, 1964.
77
In its application to the Conservation Commission, Farmers
asked that the pooling order be made retroactive to the date of first
production. The Commission issued an order granting Farmers'
71. Id.
72. Id. at 901. The fairness of this ruling is discussed infra notes 142-61 and accompanying text.
73. Wood Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 205 Okla. 534, 239 P.2d 1023 (1950). The facts of
Wood Oil II, however, did not disclose whether the well had "paid-out" prior to the date of spacing.
Additionally, Desormeaux does not disclose what the cost allocation would be for a well that has not
"paid-out" as of the date of spacing. Desormeaux v. Inexco Oil Co., 298 So. 2d at 901.
74. 187 Neb. 825, 194 N.W.2d 788(1972).
75. Farmers Irrigation Dist. v. Schumacher, 187 Neb. 825, 826-27, 194 N.W.2d 788, 789
(1972).
76. Id. at 826, 194 N.W.2d at 789.
77. Id. at 827, 194 N.W.2d at 789. In a related action, White Feather disputed Farmers' title to
the tract. Sun Oil Co. v. Emery, 183 Neb. 793, 164 N.W.2d 644 (1969). The Sun Oilcourt held that
Farmers owned the tract. Id. at 796-97, 164 N.W.2d at 646.
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request.78 White Feather and other interest owners appealed. In
reversing the Commission's order, the district court held that
Farmers' interest could not be pooled and that Farmers had not
met their burden of proof.7 9 On appeal, the supreme court reversed
the district court and ruled that the pooling order could validly
allocate production and costs among interest owners retroactively
to the date of first production.80
The first issue addressed by the Nebraska Supreme Court was
whether the lot could be pooled.8 ' The court reviewed several
provisions of the Nebraska Oil and Gas Conservation Act and
concluded that the correlative rights of all interest owners must be
protected. 82 The court then quoted rule 313(b) of the Oil and Gas
Conservation Commission rules which provides:
All wells drilled to sources of supply at estimated depths
in excess of two thousand five hundred (2500) feet for
which no spacing pattern has been established by existing
wells shall be drilled on 40-acre legal subdivisions or equivalent
lots and not less than five hundred (500) feet from the
boundaries of said legal subdivisions.1
8 3
The Nebraska Conservation Act authorizes the Conservation
Commission to pool all interests in a spacing unit.8 4 In holding that
the pooling order was entered properly, the court apparently
concluded that this rule established "statewide spacing units." The
opinion appears to be consistent with the Oklahoma view that
pooling is retroactive to the date of spacing since the court
interprets Nebraska's well location rule as a statewide spacing rule.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, however, has ruled that a similar
Corporation Commission rule does not establish statewide spacing
units. 85 Farmers also varies from the Oklahoma decisions in another
important respect. Farmers emphasizes the important role that
conservation acts play in protecting correlative rights. 86 On the
other hand, the Oklahoma decisions emphasize the rule of
78. 187 Neb. at 826, 194 N.W.2d at 789.
79. Id. at 826-27, 194 N.W.2d at 789.
80. Id- at 832-33, 194 N.W.2d at 792.
81. Id. at 827, 194 N.W.2d at 789.
82. Id. at 830-31, 194 N.W.2d at 791.
83. Id. at 831, 194 N.W.2d at 791 (emphasis added by court).
84. NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-909 (1943) (currently codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-909 (1978)).
85. Carter Oil Co. v. State, 205 Okla. 541, 240 P.2d 787 (1951). In Carter Oil the Oklahoma
Supreme Court held that the Oklahoma Conservation Act prohibited such an interpretation. Id. at
__ 240 P.2d at 794 (interpreting OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, S 86.4, 87.1 (West Supp. 1949))
(currently codified at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §S 86.4, 87.1 (West 1969 & Supp. 1981-1982)).
86. 187 Neb. at 828-29, 194 N.W.2d at 790.
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capture's role in protecting correlative rights.87 The opinion in
Farmers implies that the court believed that ideally production
should be allocated back to the date of first production.
88
The court qualified its holding, however, by stating that
pooling need not be retroactive in instances in which retroactivity
would be inequitable.8 9 Nonetheless, the court said that since
Farmers had notified the operator of their claim shortly after the
well's completion, a retroactive order to the date of first production
was just and equitable. 90
In deciding what is just and equitable, one might conclude
that Farmers should have agreed to participate in the well prior to
drilling. The court concluded, however, that even though Farmers'
notice of a claim was made after the well was completed, the notice
was timely, allowing a claim to a share as of the date of first
production. 9 1 Several questions remain unanswered: Did Farmers
not realize that the well was being drilled until after it was
completed? Did Farmers have doubts about its own title until it
made its claim? 92 If so, do these acts excuse Farmers from offering
87. See, e.g., Wood Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 205 Okla. 537, 239 P.2d 1023 (1950),
88. 187 Neb. at 831-33. 194 N.W.2d at 791-92. The implication can be drawn from the
following paragraph of the court's opinion:
The primary question is the second mentioned. Can the order allocating
production be made retroactive to the date production commenced? Under the
common law rule of capture, appellees would have been entitled to all oil produced
and appellants only remedy would have been to drill its own well. With the adoption of
the Oil and Gas Conservation Act, a landowner could no longer so protect his interest.
It became necessary to get a drilling permit and the act contemplates that there shall be only
one well if that one can adequately pump out the oil in the pool. Here the appellants are entirely
dependent for protection on the pooling order allocating to them a share in the
production and the costs of production of appellees' well. The several sections of the act
consistently stress the protection of correlative rights. They are clearly designed to protect adjoining
landowners under whose lands a pool may extend. To do so in a fair, reasonable, and adequate
manner, and to permit an adjoining owner to obtain, recover, and receive hisjust and equitable share,
the pooling order may be made retroactive to the time production started and, insofar as costs are
concerned, to the start of drilling operations. Unless the order may be made effective
retroactively, it may on occasion verge on the confiscatory.
Id. (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 832, 194 N.W.2d at 792. In Farmers the court stated the following:
There is ordinarily no good reason why an adjoining owner should not ask for a
voluntary pooling agreement at the time his neighbor starts to drill and thereby share
in the expense, as well as in production, whether or not the well proves successful. The
statutes clearly intend that rights shall be resolved upon an equitable basis. To permit
an adjoining owner to sit back and await the successful outcome of drilling operations
without asking for a pooling agreement would place the entire risk and the entire
expense upon the party drilling in the event of an unsuccessful operation. This would




92. Title to the tract was litigated in Sun Oil Co. v. Emery, 183 Neb. 793, 164 N.W.2d 644
(1969).
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to voluntarily pool before drilling was commenced?
Additionally, must the drilling party be the party to request
voluntary pooling? Apparently, White Feather Petroleum and the
other appellees believed that they had title to all the oil and gas
underlying the lot. Thus, perhaps they had no reason to seek
voluntary pooling with Farmers. If so, does this excuse White
Feather from requesting voluntary pooling? In other words, which
party has a duty to initiate an effort to voluntarily pool? And when?
Moreover, how much land should be pooled? Just the
governmental lot? All land expected to be drained by the well?
With a wildcat well, how would one know what the spacing will be?
What if Farmers had offered to pool and White Feather had refused
(or had refused to pool equitably)? Conversely, what if White
Feather had offered to pool and Farmers had refused (or had
refused to pool equitably)? Finally, should-. the answer to these
questions influence whether a pooling order is made retroactive to
the date of first runs?
Justice Clinton, joined by Justices Smith and McCown, wrote
a vigorous dissent in Farmers.93 The dissenters viewed rule 313(b) of
the Nebraska Oil and Gas Commission 94  as merely a "well
location" rule and not a "statewide spacing" rule. 95 The dissenters
argued that the Conservation Act contemplated specific orders
93. 187 Neb. at 833-34, 194 N.W.2d at 792. Justice Clinton began with the following summary
of his dissent:
I believe the majority opinion is seriously erroneous in several important
particulars, some of which I will enumerate forthwith. (1) It misreads, misinterprets,
and misapplies the "pooling" provision of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act and
disregards and seems to make inapplicable the statutory requirement of establishment
of "spacing units" as a precondition for pooling. (2) It ignores and permits the
commission to ignore that body's own rules with reference to the establishment of
"spacing units." (3) It apparently replaces the spacing unit determination called for
by the statute with a privately given "notice of claim." (4) It takes from the owner
proceeds of oil lawfully produced from the owner's well and gives it to another under
the guise of "pooling" all contrary to well-established and fundamental principles of
oil and gas property law. (5) It violates fundamental principles of property law
pertaining to ownership of oil and gas heretofore announced by this court and which
have become rules of property law. (6) It creates confusion by using the term "pool"
which is defined in the statute, when it should be referring to "spacing unit." A pool is
the reservoir. A spacing unit is that portion of the pool (established by act of the
commission after hearing) which can be drained by one well and the production of
which is to be shared where there exists separate ownership of tracts within the spacing
unit. (7) It interprets the oil and gas act - or I presume the rule requiring the permit
to drill - as preventing an owner of oil and gas from protecting his interests by
drilling a well to prevent drainage. This is nonsense. Permits are granted
administratively and routinely, and where required unorthodox location hearings are
one of the most common types of hearing. The commission cannot arbitrarily deny a
permit despite the apparent implication in the majority opinion. (8) It cites no
authority for its interpretation of the act and ignores respectable and weighty authority
from other jurisdictions. (9) It ignores some of the issues raised by the parties.
Id. at 833-34, 194 N.W.2d at 792-93 (citations omitted).
94. For the text of rule 313(b), see supra text accompanying note 83.
95. 187 Neb. at 839, 194 N.W.2d at 795.
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establishing spacing units for "a pool" and that rule 313(b) is not a
"spacing" order because it has statewide application to all lands
whether or not there are known "pools" of oil or gas present. 96 The
dissenters also argued that the issuance of a spacing or pooling
order is an adjudicatory function requiring notice to interested
parties and an opportunity to be heard. 97
The dissenters discussed whether a pooling order could be
issued prior to the issuance of a spacing order. 98 They stated that
the rule of capture governs the rights of the parties only prior to
spacing. 99 Thus, a pooling order could be retroactive only to the
date spacing units were established. 100 The dissenters concluded
that the case should be remanded to the Commission for an
allocation of the drilling, completing, and production costs between
White Feather and Sun Oil Company. The dissenters stated that,
Sun should not be charged with well drilling costs attributable to
the production prior to spacing since Sun would not share in those
proceeds. 101
The Nebraska Supreme Court later addressed the issue of
retroactive pooling orders in Ohmart v. Dennis. 102 The fact situation
was nearly identical to Farmers. In Ohmart, however, the lessee of a
strip of property owned by the United States sought compulsory
pooling of a lot. 10 3 The United States objected at first to the
pooling; consequently, issuance of a final pooling order was
delayed through the fault of the United States. 0 4 Nonetheless, the
order was made retroactive to the date of well completion. 10 5 The
court noted that it had "strong doubts" about whether a
retroactive pooling order was equitable, 10 6 but allowed the order to
stand. 10 7 Justice Newton dissented on the grounds that retroactivity
was not proper in this case because of the delay caused by the
United States. 1
08
96. Id. The dissenters also cited Carter Oil Co. v. State, 205 Okla. 541, 240 P.2d 787 (1951), as
support for their position. 187 Neb. at 839, 194 N.W.2d at 795.
97. 187 Neb. at 840, 194 N.W.2d at 795.
98. Id. at 840, 194 N.W.2d at 796.
99. Id. The dissenters cited Wood Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 205 Okla. 537, 239 P.2d
1023 (1950) (Wood Oil II), as authority for their view. 187 Neb. at 841, 194 N.W.2d at 796.
100. 187 Neb. at 841, 194 N.W.2d at 796.
101. id. at 843, 194 N.W.2d at 797. This matter will be discussed infra notes 142-61 and
accompanying text.
102. 188 Neb. 260, 196 N.W. 2d 181 (1972).
103. Ohmart v. Dennis, 188 Neb. 260,262, 196 N.W 2d 181. 184 (1972).
104. Id. at 264, 196 N.W.2d at 184-85.
105. Id. at 266, 196 N.W.2d at 185. The well was completed one day prior to the date of first
runs. Id. at 262, 196 N.W.2d at 183.
106. Id. at 266, 196 N.W.2d at 185.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 266, 196 N.W.2d at 186. Justice Clinton also dissented in part. In his opinion,
Justice Clinton referred to his dissent in Farmers Irrigation Dist. v. Schumacher, 187 Neb. 825, 833,
194 N.W.2d 788, 792 (1972). 188 Neb. at 266, 196 N.W.2d at 186.
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Thus, the Nebraska Supreme Court has taken the position
that compulsory pooling orders generally will be retroactive to the
date of first runs. Also, drilling costs apparently will be allocated
proportionately among ll nondrilling working interest owners. 109
D. COLORADO
In an unreported Colorado federal court case, Judge Richard
P. Matsch ruled that a compulsory pooling order is not retroactive
and takes effect only prospectively. 110 His reasoning was based on
the rule of capture. Judge Matsch, however, ignored the fact that
the establishment of spacing units effectively prohibited the other
interest owners from protecting themselves under the rule of
capture.1" Judge Matsch simply concluded that "there is no
requirement under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution that a pooling order . be made
retroactive .... ,112
E. ANALYSIS
1. Allocation of Production
Little has been written about whether a pooling order should
be retroactive. 1 3 William Balkovatz briefly discusses the issue in an
article advising attorneys about practice before oil and gas
conservation commissions.1 4  Balkovatz suggests that the
Oklahoma view that pooling orders may be retroactive to the date
of spacing is the best because it strikes a balance
between the rule of capture and due process. 15 He states:
With the possible exception of Nebraska .. .none of
the Rocky Mountain States have abrogated the rule of
capture except by their state-wide drilling rules and their
109. Farmers Irrigation Dist. v. Schumacher, 187 Neb. 825, 831-33, 194 N.W.2d 788, 791-92
(1972).
110. Gull Oil Corp. v. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, No. 76-M-411 (D. Colo. June 8,
1978).
111. See id. slip op. at 4-5 (no mention of prohibition of drilling of wells by other interest owners
due to spacing unit). This case is summarized in Balkovatz, Practice and Procedure Before Oil and Gas
Commissions-Some Nuts and Bolts, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 14-1, 14-26 to -27 (1979).
112. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, No. 76-M-41 1, slip op. at 7 (D. Colo.
june 8, 1978).
113. See, e.g., 5 E. KUNTZ, THE LAW OF OIL & GAS SS 77.3-.4 (1978 & Supp. 1981); 6 WILLIAMS
& MEYERS, supra note 5, S 970.3. These works summarize some of the views regarding the
retroactivity of pooling orders, but do not critically analyze them.
114. Balkovatz, supra note 111. In this article Mr. Balkovatz summarizes the Colorado,
Oklahoma, and Nebraska views on whether and to what extent pooling orders may be retroactive.
Id. at 14-25 to -32.
115. Id. at 14-28.
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statutes providing for establishment of drilling units.
Accordingly, it is submitted that the [Oklahoma] rule ...
should be followed to avoid unconstitutional taking of
property and to assure equitable distribution to all parties
owning oil and gas interests in drilling units.
116
Professor Summers states in his treatise that "the rule of
capture should disappear from the language of judicial decisions
involving the landowner's legal interest in oil and gas.' 117 In
another section of his treatise, however, Summers suggests that the
rule of capture requires that compulsory pooling orders should not
be retroactive. 1t 8 Summers specifically criticizes the Wood Oil cases
for holding that pooling is retroactive to the date of spacing, at least
insofar as working interest owners are concerned. 119 In Summers'
view, working interest owners could be pooled only by compulsory
pooling procedures; thus, pooling orders are effective when
issued. 120
A case note discusses the Nebraska decisions of Ohmart'2 ' and
Farmers.122 It aptly defends the pooling of all interests in a "well
location unit" or "statewide spacing unit" to the date of first
production, under the Nebraska Oil and Gas Conservation Act and
rules. 123
116. Id.
117. 1 W. SUMMERS, LAW OF OIL & GAS § 63, at 191 (2d ed. 1954).
118. Id- 975, at 126-27.
119. Id. 975, at 128. In Oklahoma the establishment of well spacing units results in the
statutory pooling of a one-eighth royalty, but does not result in the compulsory pooling of the
working interest. Id. § 975, at 127 (citing Kingwood Oil Co. v. Hall-Jones Oil Corp., 396 P.2d 510,
512-13 (Okla. 1964)). Seealso OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1 (1971).
120. 5 W. SUMMERS, supra note 117, § 975, at 128.
121. 188 Neb. 260, 196 N.W.2d 181 (1972).
122. 187 Neb. 825, 194 N.W.2d 788 (1972).
123. See 7 CREIGHTON L. REV. 121, 125-26 (1973). This case note also defends the treating of a
statewide "well location" rule as a statewide "spacing" rule so that pooling may occur. Id. at 128-
29.
Both Nebraska and North Dakota require that an oil well be drilled in the center of a legal
subdivision - essentially a forty acre tract. NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-908 (1978); N.D. ADMIN. CODE
§43-02-02-18(1) (1981), In North Dakota a gas well must be drilled on a 160 acre tract. N.D. ADMIN.
CODE § 43-02-03-18(2) (1981). Even ifa 40 acre tract is divided between two or more mineral interest
owners, only one well may be drilled on the tract. The correlative rights of each owner, however,
must be protected. Pooling of such a tract must occur either prior to the drilling of the well or after
the drilling of the well. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 38-08-08(1) (1980). In the latter case the pooling order
should be retroactive to the date of first production because the "well location" or "statewide
spacing" rule prevents an adjacent owner from protecting himself under the rule of capture. N.D.
ADMIN. CODE § 43-02-03-18 (1981).
While North Dakota has a similar "well location" or statewide spacing rule, there is seldom a
delay in setting a temporary spacing pattern. Thus, pooling can usually be postponed until the
temporary spacing order for the "pool" has been issued. Then a pooling of the entire spacing unit
effective retroactively to the date of first production should protect the correlative rights of all interest
owners in the spacing unit. See supra notes 81-109 and accompanying text. See also Discussion Notes
following Farmers Irrigation Dist. v. Schumacher, 42 OIL & GAS REP. 620 (1972) (commentator suggests
that well spacing should occur prior to the issuance of a well spacing order). Stated another way, the
temporary spacing order could be deemed retroactive to the date of first production, and the pooling
order could be deemed retroactive to the date of spacing. The issue of whether a spacing order may
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An argument in support of each of these views can be made.
Which view is better may be primarily a policy decision, or it may
be a narrow legal decision reached after a close examination of a
state's oil and gas conservation laws, rules, and regulations and the
facts and circumstances of the particular case. In other words, the
"better view" could vary from state to state.
In support of the Colorado view that pooling orders are not
retroactive, 12 4 one could argue that it is most consistent with the
thrust of the common law rule of capture. Under the rule of
capture, one landowner is allowed to drain oil and gas from another
landowner without liability, so long as no waste of oil or gas
results. 125 The remedy for the landowner being drained is to drill
his own well, a self-help remedy.
Likewise, the Colorado view is a self-help remedy. A mineral
owner who is entitled to a share of production from a well has the
burden of seeking to "pool," and prior thereto, the burden of
seeking to "space" his acreage with the draining well, or the
burden of applying to the oil and gas conservation commission for
an exception location under the spacing rules so he may drill his
own well.' 2 6 If the landowner delays in seeking a pooling order or
an exception location, he is no worse off than if he failed to provide
his own remedy under the rule of capture.
The Colorado view, however, can be criticized as failing to
undo the harshness of the rule of capture that conservation acts
were partly intended to correct.12' Also, as a practical matter, once
be retroactive was raised but not addressed in a Wyoming case. Larsen v. Conservation Comm'n,
569 P.2d 87 (Wyo. 1977).
124. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, No. 76-M-411 (D. Colo. June 8,
1978), discussed supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text, is a federal district court case. The
Colorado Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue.
125. The rule of capture is "the legal rule of non-liability for (1) causing oil or gas to migrate
across property lines and (2) producing oil or gas that was originally in place under the land of
another, so long as the producing well does not trespass." OIL & GAS TERMS, supra note 3, at 667.
One commentator has stated the rule as follows: "The owner of a tract of land acquires title to the oil
and gas which he produces from wells drilled thereon, though it may be proved that part of such oil
or gas migrated from adjoining lands." Id. at 666-67 (quoting Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture and Its
Implications as Applied to Oiland Gas, 13 TEX. L. REv. 391, 393 (1935)).
126. The rule of capture makes it "economically imperative that each mineral owner drill his
land and produce at as rapid a pace as possible, for otherwise his land would be drained ofoil and gas
by wells on adjacent properties." OtL & GAS TERMS, supra note 3, at 667. The rule of capture
therefore imposes the remedy of self-help for the protection of a landowner's interest in the oil and
gas underlying his land. An adjacent owner must drill his own well or be drained.
127. In speaking of the role ofoil and gas conservation commissions in safeguarding the interests
of landowners who are generally at the mercy of the lessee in the spacing and pooling of wells, oil and
gas commentator W. Summers states the following:
A standard of the performance of the duty of a landowner not to take an undue
proportion of the oil and gas can only be determined on the basis of scientific
information respecting the physical facts of the common source of supply. Usually
such information is not available to a landowner in a suit against his neighbor.
Conservation statutes and regulations governing the spacing of wells and establishing
drilling units . . . do and are required by the courts to provide each landowner in a
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a spacing order for a field has been issued, obtaining an exception
location to drill a second well in the spacing unit is not an easy or a
routine task. 128 Moreover, the production from both wells in the
spacing unit would have to be prorated to protect the correlative
rights of other interest owners in the pool because little or no
additional hydrocarbons would be recovered from the spacing
units. Thus, an exception location would result in the drilling of an
unnecessary well.
Obtaining a pooling order may be easier than obtaining an
exception location, yet it may be a time consuming task. Several
months of production might pass before a diligent landowner could
obtain a pooling order. 129 This might be mitigated partially by
making the pooling order retroactive to the date of the application
for pooling.
common source of supply the opportunity to produce his just and equitable share of'
the oil and gas....
The landowner's correlative right-duty relations respecting oil and gas have nout
been created by conservation statutes but are the result of judicial decisions on the
basis of the peculiar physical and economic facts of these substances. . . Eventually,
perhaps, all courts will recognize that the landowner's legal interest in oil and gas in a
common source of supply is determined on the basis of the physical and economic facts
of these substances, different as they are from any other, and consists of rights that
others not take . . . an undue proportion or more than his just and equitable share.
When this stage in the development of the law of oil and gas has been reached ... the
rule of capture should disappear from the language of judicial decisions involving the
landowner's legal interest in oil and gas.
Even though clear and positive judicial and legislative recognition is given to the
landowner's common law correlative rights respecting oil and gas in the common
source of supply, a landowner may not have completely effective remedies by way of
damages or injunction for the protection of these rights. The standards of performance
of the duties not . . . to take an undue proportion will be determined by the state
conservation agency on the basis of scientific information relative to the physical facts
of the source of supply. This information, although necessary to prove a violation of
his rights, may not be readily available to the individual landowner. It seems likely,
therefore, that in most situations the violation of these rights will be protected by the
rules and orders of the conservation agencies.
I W. SUMMERS, supra note 117, § 63, at 186-91.
128. See, e.g., N.D. ADMIN. ConE 5 43-02-03-18(4) (1981). Section 43-02-03-18(4) requires that
applications to the North Dakota Industrial Commission for exception well locations show that an
exception well is necessary to prevent waste and protect correlative rights. Id. A plat showing the
exact location of the proposed well should accompany the application. Id. A copy of the application is
to be sent by certified or registered mail to all "owners or lessees" of properties adjoining the tract on
which the exception is sought. Id. While an exception location may be granted by the North Dakota
Industrial Commission without a hearing, id., this seldom happens. Therefore, a delay of at least 60
days occurs between the date of application and the date the well may be commenced. See id. § 43-
02-03-86 to -90 (1981); N.D. CENT. COnE § 38-08-11 (1980).
129. In North Dakota it is generally the well operator who seeks the pooling order. Interest
owners other than lessees (operators) are usually unaware of their right to pool. By the time a pooling
order is issued by the North Dakota Industrial Commission, at least 60 days will have passed since
the filing of the application because of delays caused by docketing, notification, and the hearing. See
N.D. ADMIN. CODE §§ 43-02-03-86 to -90 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-11 (1980). In Montana,
as a prerequisite to compulsory pooling, an applicant must prove that he or she sought to voluntarily
pool in good faith and failed. See MONT. ConE ANN. § 82-11-202 (1981) ("[iln the absence of
voluntary pooling . . ."); telephone conversation with Louis Moore, a Billings, Montana attorney
who frequently practices before the Montana Oil & Gas Conservation Board (Jan. 12, 1982) (the
Board interprets section 82-11-202 as requiring an applicant to make a good faith effort to pool before
a compulsory pooling order will be issued).
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Finally, to be consistent with the duty to fully protect
correlative rights, the pooling order should become effective no
later than a spacing order. While the concept of well spacing in the
interest of conservation is a legislative creation, the concept of
protecting correlative rights is not the creation of the legislature or
of an administrative agency, but is a common law doctrine.
Moreover, correlative rights are entitled to constitutional
protection. 30 Between the effective date of the spacing order and
the effective date of the pooling order, the owner of a nonproducing
tract within the spacing unit would not share in the existing well
and could not drill an offset well unless the oil and gas conservation
commission approved an exception location. This places an
additional burden on the landowner because, under the rule of
capture, he could have immediately drilled an offset well to protect
himself against drainage, without seeking the approval of an
administrative agency. Thus, a rigid well spacing order affecting
divided property interests that is not complemented by a
contemporaneously effective pooling order may unconstitutionally
deprive a person of property without due process of law.13
The Oklahoma and Louisiana view that pooling may be
retroactive only to the date of spacing recognizes that well spacing
fundamentally modifies the rule of capture. Once a spacing order is
issued, well locations that do not conform to the spacing "field
rules" are not permitted unless an order granting an exception
location is issued; as previously mentioned, such orders are not
routinely granted. Thus, as a practical matter, a mineral owner's
right to protect himself from drainage under the rule of capture
ceases when a well spacing order is issued. Requiring that a pooling
order be retroactive to the date of spacing merely recognizes these
practical realities.
130. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 209-10 (1900). In Ohio Oil Co., the United States
Supreme Court stated the following:
[Als to gas and oil, the surface proprietors within the gas field all have the right to
reduce to possession the gas and oil beneath. They could not be absolutely deprived of the
right which belongs to them without a taking of private property. But there is a co-equal right in
them all to take from a common source of supply, the two substances which in the
nature of things are united, though separate. It follows from the essence of their right
and from the situation of the things, as to which it can be exerted, that the use by one
of his power to seek to convert a part of the common fund to actual possession may
result in an undue proportion being attributed to one of the possessors of the rights, to
the detriment of the others, or by waste by one or more, to the annihilation of the
rights of the remainder. Hence it is that the legislative power, from the peculiar nature of the
right and the objects upon which it is to be exerted, can be manifested for the purpose of protecting all
the collective owners, by securing a just distribution, to arise from the enjoyment by them, of
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On the other hand, the Oklahoma view fails to account for any
delays in spacing a "field" or "pool" that may be the fault of the
operator of the initial well or wells or the fault of a slow
administrative process. 132 While the rule of capture allows an
owner of an interest adjacent to a producing well to drill an offset
well to protect against drainage, another well may be
"unnecessary" to economically and effectively drain the area.
A major goal of oil and gas conservation laws is the prevention
of waste. 133 One purpose of a spacing order is to prevent the drilling
of "unnecessary" wells by determining the area that one well can
economically and effectively drain. 134 Unnecessary wells recover
little or no additional oil and gas and cause the waste of oil and gas
reservoir pressures. Also, unnecessary wells result in the waste of
oil and gas at the surface due to the proliferation of pipes, valves,
fittings, production equipment, and tank batteries, which increase
the likelihood of spills and leakage. If pooling (and spacing) were
retroactive to the date of first runs, however, there would be no
need for the drilling of an offset well to protect against drainage
within the area of a spacing unit because pooling would protect the
correlative rights of all parties in the unit. In other words, an
additional well or wells in a spacing unit would be "unnecessary,"
because there would be no need for an adjacent owner to protect
himself against drainage under the rule of capture.
Even though prior to spacing no one knows definitely what
size the spacing units will be and what the geographical limits of the
pool are, the size of spacing units can usually be predicted based on
past orders of the oil and gas commission. In any event, as provided
in North Dakota's Conservation Rules,135 spacing of a field or pool
132. This latter problem may be mitigated by making a pooling order retroactive to the date of
the application for spacing or the date of docketing the spacing hearing.
133. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-03 (1980) (prohibits waste of oil and gas). One
commentator has stated that '[tihe purpose of conservation legislation is the prevention of waste in
order to achieve the greatest ultimate economic recovery of oil and gas and the protection of the
correlative rights of diverse surface owners whose properties overlie a common source of supply.'" R.
SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF OIL & GAS LAW 252 (1955) (footnote omitted).
134. See generally R. SULLIVAN, supra note 133, at 297-305. In North Dakota the Industrial
Commission is authorized to set spacing units as follows:
1. When necessary to prevent waste, to avoid the drilling of unnecessary wells, or to
protect correlative rights, the commission shall establish spacing units for a pool.
Spacing units when established shall be of uniform size and shape for the entire pool,
except that when found to be necessary for any of the purposes above mentioned, the
commission is authorized to divide any pool into zones and establish spacing units for
each zone, which units may differ in size and shape from those established in any other
zone.
2. The size and shape of spacing units are to be such as will result in the efficient and
economical development of the pool as a whole.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-07(1)-(2) (1980).
135. N.D. ADMIN. CODE ch. 43-02-03 (1981).
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should occur shortly after a wildcat discovery is made, at least on a
"temporary" basis.' 36 Pooling of all interests in spacing units
already in production should occur shortly after the spacing order
has been issued. Ideally, for development wells, spacing units
should be pooled prior to drilling.
The language of the Nebraska Supreme Court in Farmers that
implies that pooling may be retroactive to the date of first
production 37 seems to be consistent with the principal purposes of
oil and gas conservation acts - to prevent waste of oil and gas, to
prevent the drilling of unnecessary wells, and to protect fully
correlative rights. A pooling order that is retroactive to the date of
first production appears consistent with Professor Summers'
general view that "the rule of capture should disappear from the
language of judicial decisions involving the landowner's legal
interest in oil and gas."11 3 8 As previously mentioned, however,
Summers adheres to the rule of capture when commenting on this
issue. 139
If pooling were retroactive to the date of first runs, the
production from all wells, wildcat or development, would be
allocated among interest owners in a spacing unit from the date of
first runs. If, however, pooling is retroactive only to the date of
spacing, the production from development wells, drilled after the
entry of a spacing order, would be allocated retroactive to the date
of first runs. The production from "wildcat" (discovery) wells and
other wells drilled prior to spacing, however, would have two
allocations - one prior to well spacing and another following well
spacing.
In accordance with Farmers, there may be circumstances in
which a pooling order that is retroactive to first runs would not be
"just and equitable.' ' 4 0 When a delay in pooling is caused by the
bad faith or unreasonableness of the nonparticipating interest
owner, the oil and gas conservation commission or court will deny
retroactivity or assess an appropriate penalty against the non-
participating interest owner. 14'
136. Id. § 43-02-03-18(3).
137. Farmers Irrigation Dist. v. Schumacher, 187 Neb. 825, 831-33, 194 N.W.2d 788, 791-92
(1972). The Farmers court stated that to protect correlative rights "in a fair, reasonable, and adequate
manner, and to permit an adjoining owner to obtain, recover, and receive his just and equit'able
share, the pooling order may be made retroactive to the time production started." Id.
138. 1 W. SUMMERS, supra note 117, §63, at 191.
139. Id. S 975, at 126-27.
140. 187 Neb. at 831-33, 194 N.W.2d at 791-92.
141. See generally 6 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 5, §§ 972-972.4.
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2. Allocation of Costs
One of the principal advantages of treating pooling as
retroactive to the date of first production is that neither a
conservation commission nor a court need wrestle with the special
problem of cost allocation among different working interest owners
that arises from nonretroactivity. 142 In Desormeaux143 the Louisiana
Court of Appeals ruled that the working interest owner of the
producing tract in the spacing unit had to pay the total drilling and
completion costs of the well because it had "paid-out" prior to
spacing. Thus, the working interest owner 144 of the nonproducing
tract in the spacing unit received a proportionate share of the well's
production after spacing, but did not have to contribute to the
initial drilling and completion costs. Apparently, the non-
participating working interest owner was obligated to pay only the
well operating costs and workover costsfrom the date of spacing.
Making the nonparticipating working interest owner pay only
the well operating costs and workover costs from the date of spacing
may be unfair to the party that drilled the well (the operator). The
initial drilling costs contribute something to the total productive life
of the well. The nonparticipating working interest owner should
pay a share of the initial drilling costs that is proportionate to his
total share of production received over the well's lifefrom the date of
spacing. This means that the operator would also absorb a fair
share of the well costs. Ideally, the operator's fair share would be all
drilling and maintenance costs that are fairly attributable to the
well's production prior to spacing. In addition, it would include a
proportionate share of the drilling and maintenance costs that are
fairly attributable to the production allocated to the operator's tract
after spacing.
142. The cost allocation problem is noted in the discussion notes following Desormeaux v. Inexco
Oil Co. in the Oil and Gas Reporter as follows:
It would appear that the Court has ignored the fact that its decision results in the
unjust enrichment of the landowner at the expense of the lessee. After all, once
unitization [well spacing] was established, an interest in the well was, in effect,
appropriated to the use of the landowner's unleased acreage in that such acreage
thereafter participated in unit production. Despite the benefits resulting to the
unleased acreage, its owner was not required to compensate the lessee for his expenses
in drilling the well from which such benefits flowed.
50 OIL & GAS REP. 26, 27 (1975).
143. Desormeaux v. Inexco Oil Co., 298 So. 2d 897 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 302 So. 2d 37
(La. 1974).
144. The working interest owner in the nonproducing tract was also the lessor of the producing
tract; in other words, Inexco's lessor also had an unleased tract that was part of the spacing unit. 298
So. 2d at 898-99.
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In considering this issue the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in
Wood Oil 1145 appears to have reached a conclusion opposite to that
of the Louisiana Court of Appeals in Desormeaux. In Wood Oil II the
court required the nonparticipating working interest owners (of the
nonproducing tract) to pay a proportionate share of the well cost
without any deduction for the production retained by the operator
prior to pooling. 146 This seems unfair unless one justifies the ruling
as a penalty for the failure of the nonparticipating working interest
owners to participate upfront in the drilling venture. Such a penalty
is also unfair because the result could vary markedly from one
situation to another. 
14 7
To illustrate the unfairness of the Desormeaux and Wood Oil II
cases, consider a simple example: Suppose on January 1, 1983, X
Oil Company drills and completes a well on its forty acre tract at a
cost of one million dollars. X produces the well for one year before
a spacing order setting 160 acre well spacing units becomes
effective on January 1, 1984. During 1983 the well produced
100,000 barrels of oil, more than enough to "payout." After
spacing, Y Oil Company claims a share in the well because it holds
a forty acre tract in the spacing unit. Z Oil Company, which holds
the remaining eighty acre tract in the spacing unit, also claims a
share of the well. Assume that petroleum engineers for X, Y, and Z
have calculated the recoverable barrels of oil from that well and
agreed that the well will produce a total of 1,000,000 barrels of oil.
The engineers have agreed that the estimated life of the well is
twenty years.
Under Desormeaux, Y and Z would not have to contribute
anything to the cost of the well since it had reached "payout" prior
to spacing. 148 Yet, both Y and Z will benefit from the drilling of the
well for as long as it produces. Under Wood Oil II, however, Y and
Z would have to contribute to the cost of the well on an acreage
allocation basis without a deduction or discount for the 100,000
barrels of oil that X kept for itself. 149 It appears that allocating well
costs among all working interest owners based on their actual
shares in production over the well's life would be more fair. 150
An alternate method, calculating shares on both a production
145. Wood Oil Co. v. Corporation Corm'n, 205 Okla. 537, 239 P. 2d 1023 (1950).
146. Id. at__ , 239 P.2d at 1027-28.
147. For a discussion of such penalties, see 6 WtLtIAMS & MFYERS, supra note 5.. 942-944,
148. See Desormeaux %v. Inexco Oil Co.. 298 So. 2d at 901.
149. See Wood Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 205 Okla. at -, 239 P.2d at 1027-28.
150. See 50 On- & GAs REP. 26, 27 (1975). This result can be avoided if pooling is considered
retroactive to the date offirst runs.
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and acreage basis, accomplishes a fair distribution. This method is
applied to the above fact situation as follows:
1. X pays for all drilling and completion costs attributable to the
entire production which X received prior to the date of spacing:
100,000 barrels to X in 1983 x $1,000,000.00 drilling
1,000,000 recoverable barrels and completion costs
- $100,000.00 payable by X for 1983 (prespacing) production.
2. X also pays a share of the costs attributable to the production X
received after the date of spacing:
$1,000,000.00 total drilling costs
- 100,000.00 costs attributable prior to spacing
$ 900,000.00 costs attributable after spacing
40 acres (X's tract) x $900,000.00 cost attributable
160 acres (spacing unit) after spacing
= $225,000.00 payable by X for life of the well after spacing.
3. Y pays a share of the costs attributable to the production Y
received after the date of spacing:
40 acres (Y's tract) x $900,000.00 cost attributable
160 acres (spacing unit) after spacing
= $225,000.00 payable by Y for life of the well after spacing.
4. Z pays a share of the costs attributable to the production Z
received after the date of spacing:
80 acres (Z's tract) x $900,000.00 cost attributable
160 acres (spacing unit) after spacing
= $450,000.00 payable by Y for life of the well after spacing.
Under this formula, X would pay 32 2 % of the drilling and
completion costs and receive 32 Y % of the production. Y would
pay 22 Y % of the drilling and completion costs and receive 22 Y %
of the production, and Z would pay 45% of the drilling and
completion costs and receive 45% of the production. Y's and Z's
shares of the drilling and completion costs would be calculated and
deducted from their share of the production before they would
actually receive any production income.
This formula fairly distributes the well costs to all the working
interest owners in accordance with their share of production. 151 An
151. Such a formula does not prevent the allocation ofa penalty for failure to join.
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actual situation, however, may not be so simple. The fairness of
this allocation depends upon the accuracy of the estimate of
recoverable reserves. Estimates of recoverable reserves are just
that, estimates. Such estimates are dependent upon a number of
factors, and the estimates can vary from year to year or even from
month to month. Moreover, the petroleum engineers for X, Y, and
Z are not likely to agree on the recoverable reserves in a given well
spacing unit. Consequently, a fair and practical application of this
allocation formula would be difficult if not impossible. The actual
result would be a highly speculative allocation of production costs
that could be corrected only after the well was plugged at the
completion of production, perhaps in twenty years or more.
In his treatise 15 2 Professor Summers offers another formula.
153
Nonparticipating working interest owners would not be entitled to
a share of the well until after the pooling order has been entered. 1
5 4




should be reduced to "present value" and allocated among all
working interest owners on an acreage basis. 156 Present value is to
be arrived at by "actual depreciation rather than alleged benefits
the well owner may have obtained in the unpooled period. "157
Summers offers no case citations or examples illustrating his
proposal. If, however, he means simple straight line depreciation of
the well, allocation of costs in the above example would be as
follows:
1. Estimated life of the well is 20 years.
2. Total drilling and completion costs were $1,000,000.00.
3. Annual depreciation equals $1,000,000.00/20 years or
$50,000.00.
4. If pooling occurs on January 1, 1984, contemporaneously with
spacing:
a. X would receive 100,000 barrels of production and would be
charged with one year's depreciation, $50,000.00. Present





157. Id. Summers criticizes other views by stating the following:
It can be argued that the proportion of produced and remaining reserves should be the
measure of the discount; also that a poor well should be valued according to its
remaining utility as a productive instrument, but either seems unsound. The rule of
capture principle answers the first contention. As to the second, working interest
owners either should pay full depreciated well investment value or not participate any
more than they would had they elected the alternative of being carried by the drilling
party subject to payout before they participate.
Id. § 945, at 127.
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value of the well onJanuary 1, 1983, would be $950,000.00.
b. X's share of costs would be 40/160 x $950,000.00 or
$237,500.00.
c. Y's share of costs would be 40/160 x $950,000.00 or
$237,500.00.
d. Z's share of costs would be 80/160 x $950,000.00 or
$475,000.00.
Assuming that the estimate of the recoverable barrels
(1,000,000) is correct, 58 under the Summers' formula X would pay
28%4 % ($287,500.00/$1 ,000,000.00) 5 9  of the drilling and
completion costs. X would receive 32 2 % of the production (the
100,000 pre-pooling barrels plus '4 of the 900,000 postpooling
barrels for a total of 325,000 of the 1,000,000 recoverable barrels).
Using the same calculations, Y would pay 23 Y % of the drilling
and completion costs and would receive 22 2 % of the production.
Z would pay 47 21 % of the drilling and completion costs and would
receive 45 % of the production.
Summers' formula may provide a reasonable balance between
the Desormeaux and Wood Oil II rulings and the more complex and
speculative formula outlined above. The result under the
Summers' formula, however, can -vary substantially depending on
the ratio between well costs and production prior to pooling. In the
above example, if the first year's production is 200,000 barrels, X
will ultimately receive 40% of the total production for its interest
in the spacing unit, but will still pay only 28 4 % of the costs of
drilling and completion. Y would recover 20% of the total
production for its N4 interest in the spacing unit, but will still pay
23 % of the costs of drilling and completion. Z would receive
40% of the total production for its Y2 interest in the spacing unit
and will still pay 47 Y21 % of the costs of drilling and completion. In
short, the result can greatly vary depending on the cost/pre-pooling
production ratio. 60 Finally, while Summers' formula eliminates
the need for a reserve estimate, a well life estimate is necessary.
Like a reserve estimate, a well life estimate is speculative; the
158. This estimate need not be accurate under Summers' formula. The figure, however, is
useful to compare the result with other allocations.
159. The figure $287,500.00 is arrived at in the following manner:
$ 50,000.00 first year depreciation
+ 237,500.00 costs subsequent to pooling
S 287,500.00 total costs paid by X.
160. Ifone purpose of the formula is to penalize the nondrilling working interests, it seems that a
more consistent alternative may exist. See 6 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 5, 5§ 942-944.
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petroleum engineers for X, Y, and Z are likely to disagree about
the estimated well life. If production were allocated from the date of
first production rather than from the date of spacing, the use of
such a formula would be unnecessary. Production in the above
example would be credited and costs would be recovered by a
simple acreage allocation without regard to estimated well life or
estimated recovery:
1. X and Y would each receive 40/160 of the production and would
each be liable for 40/160 of all the costs. 40 acres/160 acres x
$1,000,000.00 = $250,000.00 each.
2. Z would receive 80/160 of the production and would be liable for
80/160 of the costs. 80 acres/160 acres x $1,000,000.00 -
$500,000.00.
Y's and Z's proportionate shares of the well costs would simply be
subtracted upfront from Y's and Z's shares of the production.
There would be no need for future reallocations based on changing
reserve or well life estimates.
Thus, from the standpoint of allocating drilling costs among
working interest owners, treating pooling as retroactive to the date
of first production offers a simple solution to this problem. Also,
correlative rights would be protected because each interest owner
would receive a just and equitable share of the production based on
the oil and gas produced from the well spacing unit.
Each working interest would pay a proportionate share of the
drilling and completion costs as well. If a penalty for failing to
participate upfront in the drilling venture is deemed suitable, a
penalty could be superimposed over this initial allocation. For
example, the nonparticipating working interest owner could be
assessed a risk capital charge over and above the actual drilling and
completion expenses. The amount of the charge could be based on
the state's producer/dry-hole ratio for "wildcat" or "develop-
ment" wells, or it could simply be the prime rate of interest plus a
specified percent. 161
F. NORTH DAKOTA
As noted in the previous section, each view concerning when a
pooling order should become effective can be supported and
criticized. Which view is followed in a particular state, however,
161. Id.
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should depend on that state's specific conservation laws, rules, and
regulations. This author believes that pooling in North Dakota
should be retroactive to the date of first runs (production).
North Dakota's Oil and Gas Conservation Act declares that
the policy of the state is "to authorize and to provide for the
operation and development of oil and gas properties in such a
manner that a greater ultimate recovery of oil and gas be had and
that the correlative rights of all owners be fully protected." '1 62 In
furtherance of this policy, the Industrial Commission is given the
authority to regulate the spacing of wells. 
163
The Industrial Commission is also guided in well spacing by a
specific spacing statute. 164 The Commission is to set spacing units
"[w]hen necessary to prevent waste, to avoid the drilling of
unnecessary wells, or to protect correlative rights. "165 Spacing
units are to provide for the "efficient and economical
development" of pools, and well locations are to conform to a
"reasonably uniform spacing plan.''1 6 6 In the event wells are
drilled as exceptions to the well spacing pattern, such wells may not
produce more than a "just and equitable share" of production. 1
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162. N.D. CENT. CODE S 38-08-01 (1980).
163. Id. § 38-04-04(2)(c) (Supp. 1981).
164. Id. § 38-08-07. Section 38-08-07 provides the following:
The commission shall set spacing units as follows:
I. When necessary to prevent waste, to avoid the drilling of unnecessary wells, or to
protect correlative rights, the commission shall establish spacing units for a pool.
Spacing units when established shall be of uniform size and shape for the entire
pool, except that when found to be necessary for any of the purposes above
mentioned, the commission is authorized to divide any pool into zones and
establish spacing units for each zone, which units may differ in size and shape from
those established in any other zone.
2. The size and shape of spacing units are to be such as will result in the efficient and
economical development of the pool as a whole.
3. An order establishing spacing units for a pool shall specify the size and shape of
each unit and the location of the permitted well thereon in accordance with a
reasonably uniform spacing plan. Upon application, if the commission finds that a
well drilled at the prescribed location would not produce in paying quantities, or
that surface conditions would substantially add to the burden or hazard of drilling
such well, the commission is authorized to enter an order permitting the well to be
drilled at a location other than that prescribed by such spacing order; however, the
commission shall include in the order suitable provisions to prevent the production
from the spacing unit of more than its just and equitable share of the oil and gas in
the pool.
4. An order establishing units for a pool shall cover all lands determined or believed
to be underlaid by such pool, and may be modified by the commission from time to
time to include additional areas determined to be underlaid by such pool. When
found necessary for the prevention of waste, or to avoid the drilling of unnecessary
wells, or to protect correlative rights, an order establishing spacing units in a pool
may be modified by the commission to increase or decrease the size of spacing units
in the pool or any zone thereof, or to permit the drilling of additional wells on a
reasonably uniform plan in the pool, or any zone thereof, or an additional well on






The Commission has exercised its well spacing authority by
promulgating a spacing rule that provides for a spacing hearing
within thirty days after the completion of a wildcat well. 16 A
''temporary" spacing order is generally issued within thirty days
following the spacing hearing. 69 According to the spacing rule,
"[d]uring the interim period between the discovery and the
issuance of the temporary [spacing] order no permits shall be issued
for the drilling of direct offsets to the discovery well."
' 170
Furthermore, the chief enforcement officer for the Commission has
the discretion to determine well location patterns prior to actual
spacing to "ensure orderly development of the pool or
reservoir.'' In other words, if the chief enforcement officer
anticipates that the Commission will decree 160 acre temporary
spacing, he may limit drilling permits to those that will conform to
such a pattern. Thus, as a practical matter, the owner of a working
interest adjacent to a producing wildcat well will not be allowed to
protect himself under the rule of capture by drilling an immediate
offset well. Because of this, production should be allocated within a
well spacing unit retroactive to the date of first production.
Otherwise, the correlative rights of adjacent owners will not be fully
protected.
One might argue that North Dakota's Conservation Act does
not permit retroactive spacing or pooling orders. 72 Nothing in the
Act, however, appears specifically to prohibit retroactivity. North
Dakota's compulsory pooling statute need not be read to prohibit
retroactive pooling either to the date of spacing or to the date of first
runs. Furthermore, North Dakota's well spacing statute does not
preclude retroactivity of spacing orders. 7 3 Indeed, the previously
discussed Commission rules imply that well spacing should be
retroactive. 7 4 Also, the Commission's well spacing orders specify
168. N.D. ADMIN. CODE S 43-02-03-18(3)(1981).
169. N .D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-11(6) (1980). Section 38-08-11(6) provides the following:
The commission may act upon its own motion, or upon the petition of any interested
person. On the filing of a petition concerning any matter within the jurisdiction of the
commission, the commission shall promptly fix a date for a hearing thereon, and shall
cause notice of the hearing to be given. The hearing shall be held without undue delay
after the filing of the petition. The commission shall enter its order within thirty days
after the hearing. A copy of the order of the commission shall be forwarded by mail to
those persons filing written appearances at the hearing.
Id.
170. N.D. ADMIN. CODE S 43-02-03-18(3) (1981). Direct offsets are defined as "wells drilled on
forty-acre (16. 19-hectare) tracts directly north and south, or east and west of each other. " Id. S 43-
02-03-01(17).
171. Id. S 43-02-03-18(3).
172. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 38-08-08 (1980).
173. Id. S 38-08-07 (Supp. 1981).
174. See supra notes 162-71 and accompanying text.
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that they are retroactive for the purpose of allocating production.
Commission well spacing orders contain the following provision:
"That for purposes of division of production to owners of interests
in spacing units established by this order, and proven productive
prior to the date hereof, this order shall be retroactive to the date of
first production."I 75 Also, a provision is commonly inserted into all
spacing orders providing that if any existing wells do not conform
to the provision of the spacing order, the same are approved and
permitted as exceptions to the order.'7 6 Pooling orders contain no
provision that they are retroactive. In light of the above quotation
from a spacing order, however, one would presume that such
orders are intended to be retroactive to the date of first production
whether the well in question was drilled prior to or after spacing.
In Amoco Production Co. v. North Dakota Industrial Commission
1 77
the North Dakota Supreme Court did not address the specific issue
of whether a pooling order can be retroactive. The court did uphold
a "proper" well spacing order178 of -the Industrial Commission,
which specified that any distribution of production royalties to
owners of separate tracts in a specific well spacing unit was to occur
from the effective date of the spacing order. 79 The Commission
previously had issued an order setting "temporary" 320 acre well
spacing units in the Rattlesnake Point Field-Duperow Pool. 180 In
accordance with that order, the operator of the discovery well,
located in the northwest quarter of a section, designated the north
one-half of the section as the well spacing unit. Although the
operator held leases for the entire section there were several fee
mineral owners of the section, some of whom owned divided
interests.1 8' Approximately eighteen months after the entry of the
"temporary" spacing order, in accordance with its spacing rule,
the Commission held a "proper" spacing hearing.8 2 Following
this hearing, the Commission entered a "proper" spacing order
that redesignated the 320 acre spacing unit for the "discovery"
well as the west one-half of the section. 8 3 The Commission found
175. See, e.g., North Dakota Indus. Comm'n Order Nos. 2390, 2391 (May 21, 1981).
176. Id.
177. 307 N.W.2d 839 (N.D. 1981).
178. North Dakota Indus. Comm'n Order No. 2109 (June 19, 1980), aff'g Order No. 1884
(August 10, 1979).
179. Amoco Prod. Co. v. North Dakota Indus. Comm'n, 307 N.W.2d 839, 848-49 (N.D.
1981).
180. North Dakota Indus. Comm'n Order No. 1652 (Jan. 12, 1978).
181. 307 N.W.2d at 840.
182. Id. The spacing rule is found in the North Dakota Administrative Code. N.D. ADMIN.
CODE § 43-02-03-18 (1981).
183. North Dakota Indus. Comm'n Spacing Order No. 1884 (Aug. 10, 1979), aff'd, Order No.
2109 (June 19, 1980).
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that the redesignation was necessary to protect the correlative rights
of the mineral interest owners in the section. 
18 4
In the "proper" spacing order 85 the Commission inserted the
following paragraph which addressed the allocation of production
in the redesignated unit: "That for the purposes of division of
production to owners of interests in spacing units established
herein, this order shall be effective . . . on the 1st day of
September, 1979."1186 The proponent of the redesignation of the
well spacing unit, an oil and gas lessor in the southwest quarter of
the section, specifically waived any right to have the production
reallocated back to the date of first runs. Thus, the Commission did
not have to face the issue of whether production should have been
reallocated to the date of first runs. Because the operator of the well
had allocated the initial production and because the lessors and
royalty interest owners had received their royalties in reliance on
the "temporary" well spacing order, the reallocation of those
payments would not have been equitable.
There was no suggestion that the Commission acted in bad
faith in issuing the "temporary" well spacing order or that the well
operator acted in bad faith in allocating production based on that
temporary order. In appealing the "proper" well spacing order,
the operator and certain mineral lessors who owned minerals in the
north one-half of the section argued, interalia,' 87  that the
Commission had no authority to set a date for reallocation of
production from the redesignated unit because that constituted
setting an effective date for a "pooling" order.' 88  The North
Dakota Supreme Court, however, refused to consider this issue,
since the appellants had not raised the matter at the initial
184. 307 N.W.2d at 841. The original order redesignating the well spacing unit as the west one-
halfwas Order No. 1884, issued August 10, 1979. Brief for Appellee at 1, Amoco Prod. Co. v. North
Dakota Indus. Comm'n, 307 N.W.2d 839 (N.D. 1981). The operator and certain mineral lessors
who owned minerals in the north one-half of the section appealed this order. Id. at 1-2. The district
court remanded the matter to the Industrial Commission for a new hearing because the Commission
had not made sufficient findings of fact. Id. at 2. A new hearing was held and the Commission issued
Order No. 2109. This order contained additional findings of fact and reached the same conclusion as
Order No. 1884. Id. The operator therefore appealed Order No. 2109. Both the district court, id. at
4, and the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed Order No. 2109. 307 N.W.2d at 849.
185. North Dakota Indus. Comm'n Order No. 1884 (Aug. 10, 1979), aff'd, Order No. 2109
(June 19, 1980).
186. Id. The delay between July 24 and September 1 was extended by the Industrial
Commission to give advance notice to the well operator (Amoco) that a new division of production
would be necessary in the redesignated area. 307 N.W.2d at 849.
187. The appellants also argued that the Industrial Commission could not modify an existing
well spacing unit as a matter of law and that the Commission order was not supported by substantial
and credible evidence. 307 N.W.2d at 840-41.
188. Id. at 848, To support this argument the appellants cited Schank v. North Am. Royalties,
Inc., 201 N.W.2d 419 (N.D. 1972), for the proposition that spacing and pooling are separate
concepts. As a result, the Industrial Commission could not set a production allocation date in a well
spacing order. 307 N.W.2d at 848-49.
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"proper" well spacing hearing of the Commission or at the
rehearing of the matter by the Commission. 8 9
The Commission's decision setting a date for the reallocation
of production, however, is supportable for the purpose of giving the
operator advance notice concerning when the Commission believed
the production should be reallocated. The setting of a specific date
in the "proper" spacing order notified the operator of what the
Commission believed was the appropriate time to divide the
production for the protection of correlative rights. Perhaps that
date could be officially set only in a pooling order, 90 but providing
an operator or other party responsible for the payment of royalties
with advance notice of what the Commission believes is the just and
equitable way to protect correlative rights hardly seems illegal or
inappropriate.
In summary, the decision in Amoco does not conflict with this
author's position that production in a well spacing unit should
normally be allocated to the date of first runs. The situation in
Amoco, a redesignation of an existing well spacing unit, is clearly
distinguishable from the initial setting of a well spacing unit in a
"temporary" well spacing order. In this latter situation, prior to
the issuance of any spacing order, peither the well operator nor the
oil and gas purchaser has made an allocation of production in
reliance on a previously issued spacing order. Also, the lessors or
other interest owners entitled to royalties have not received
production payments in reliance on such an order. In Amoco,
however, production was allocated and production payments were
received in reliance upon a previously issued temporary spacing
order.
Amoco illustrates one situation in which it would not be
equitable to allocate production retroactive to the date of first runs.
There may be other situations as well: (1) When an interest owner
was given a fair and equitable opportunity to pool, and refused; or
(2) when an interest owner from an unproductive tract
unreasonably delayed well spacing or pooling. 191
189. 307 N.W.2d at 849.
190. In Schank v. North Am. Royalties, Inc. the North Dakota Supreme Court did not divide the
production among all the interest owners in the well spacing unit from the date of first production
without an existing pooling order; however, undivided, as opposed to divided, interests were
involved. Schank v. North Am. Royalties, Inc., 201 N.W.2d 419, 434 (N.D. 1972). The law of
cotenancy is clear that the owners of undivided interests are entitled to a proportionate share of all
the production from a well. See 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 5, § 504.1, at 580-81. The issue of
whether the same should be true of divided interest owners in a well spacing unit has not been
decided in North Dakota.
191. See, e.g., Ohmart v. Dennis, 188 Neb. 260, 196 N.W.2d 181 (1972). In Ohmart the majority
stated that it had "strong doubts" about the equity of retroactivity for this reason. Id. at 266, 196
N.W.2d at 185. Additionally, onejudge dissented for this reason. Id. at 266, 196 N.W.2d at 185-86.
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Generally, however, allocating production in a well spacing
unit to the date of first runs fully protects correlative rights in North
Dakota. This is especially true when the operator holds all the
leases in the entire spacing unit, but there are several lessors who
own separate tracts in the well spacing unit. The operator may not
pool all the interests immediately because the operator's share of
production will usually not be affected. 192 While the operator would
likely pool the tracts before future delay rentals were payable,
several months of production could occur before pooling occurs.
Although pooling should generally be retroactive to the date of
first runs, appropriate penalties should be assessed against
nonparticipating working interest owners who were given an
opportunity to participate upfront in the drilling, but refused. The
North Dakota Industrial Commission has not assessed penalties for
"free-loading" working interest owners at this time, however, the
Commission should consider assessing penalties. Such penalties
should not consist of a nonretroactive pooling order because such a
penalty may not be just and equitable to any of the interest owners
and could be viewed as arbitrary and capricious. As previously
discussed, a risk capital penalty seems more appropriate. 193
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether compulsory pooling orders may be retroactive, and if
so, to what point in time, are complex and debatable questions.
This Article was not written for the purpose of criticizing or
commending either existing case law or the views of other legal
writers. Indeed, the "better view" may vary from state to state.
The author has suggested possible answers to these questions in
North Dakota. This author believes that a compulsory pooling
order normally should be retroactive to the date of first production.
Stated another way, a well spacing order should be retroactive to
the date of first production and a compulsory pooling order should
be retroactive to the effective date of spacing.
192. Note, however, that an operator could gain by delaying pooling when a lessor of a
nonproducing tract in the well spacing unit is entitled to a higher royalty.
193. See6 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 5, 55 942-944.
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